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Death of Charitable Trust Corporation Law
B. Richard Sutter*
S INCE THE SUBJECT of non-profit corporations covers such a broad area,
this paper will be limited to "Type B corporations" 1 (i.e., the
"charitable" type) as described in the new New York Not-For-Profit
Corporations Law. These classifications of the new statutory concept
(Types A, B, C, D) look to the general purpose of the organization,
rather than to a very specific purpose,2 or to whether or not stock is
issued.3 The New York law further provides for the possibility of any
corporation having multiple and overlapping purposes, 4 thus providing
a very rational and simple (though debatable as to policy) test to apply
for classification purposes. 4a
It is generally felt that the administrative machinery for enforce-
ment of non-profit gifts is inadequate. 5 And who is to enforce the sub-
stantive rights of the minority members of the non-profit corporation
which possesses these gifts? Can members themselves intervene in a dis-
pute as to planned action? Upon what theory can enforcement of mi-
nority rights be made?
The purpose of this paper is to sketch the development of minority
rights in one narrow area-that of non-profit property transfers, and
especially in religious or charitable organizations. Representative state
statutes, as well as case law, are used in order to demonstrate the con-
fusing lack of uniformity in this area.
Under What Theory?
At common law, gifts to a religious society were given with the
implied trust that they be used only for the specific purpose for which
the society was founded." However, the United States Supreme Court
in Watson v. Jones7 said that so long as no trust was imposed when the
* B.A., Case-Western Reserve Univ.; Second-year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law.
1 N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. Act, § 201(b). Type B defined as having non-business
purposes that are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, cultural, or
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
2 Ohio Rev. Code, tit. 17 generally. Over 26 general chapter headings on types of
corporations are described in the statute.
3 Mich. Comp. L. Anno., § 450.117-450.119.
4 N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. Act, § 201(c).
4a For a critical analysis of the New York statute, see Oleck, Proprietary Mentality
and the New Non-Profit Corporation Laws, 20 Clev. St. L. Rev. 145 (1971).
5 Alford, The Disposition of Assets Upon Failure of a Charitable Trust or Corpora-
tion: Policy Relationship to Enforcement of Charities, 9 Utah L. Rev. 217 (1964-65).
6 Ferraria v. Vasconellos, 31 Ill. 25 (1863); Hale v. Everret, 16 Am. Rep. 82, 53 N.H. 9
(1868).
7 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) dictum.
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property was acquired for a religious organization, none would be
implied for the purpose of expelling those whose ideas of religious truth
had changed. Further, as to the rule of trusts, Professor Bogert8 indi-
cates that implied trusts to further the dogma of the church do not
necessarily represent the desires of the donor, especially where dogmas
and creeds have lost their importance in this century.
The Ohio courts have uniformly held that in congregational dis-
putes (even where property transfers are involved), majority actions
will not be enjoined by minorities.9 In the recent case of Mack v. Hus-
ton,10 the defendants (a group of members of a Unitarian church in
Cleveland), through a majority vote, had given their church property to
a black separatist group on a lease-back arrangement. The plaintiffs,
representing minority interests, sought an injunction on several grounds,
all of which were rejected by the court. In looking at the church regu-
lations, the court said that this was not a disposal of all assets, which
would have required a two-thirds vote of the members. Further, since
the regulations did not cover a partial disposition (seventy-five percent
of all assets were involved in the transfer), the court would look to the
portion of the Ohio code 1 providing for a majority vote in the disposi-
tion of all, or substantially all, of a non-profit corporation's assets. After
supervising a second vote, the court held that a majority of the members
present and constituting a quorum could dispose of substantially all of
the corporation's assets in the manner they had attempted. The court
added:
This Court would be disappointed and disillusioned if at a later
date it developed that the actions of the membership of the So-
ciety. . . were only the first step in a two-step procedure to change
the location or terminate the operation.12
Subsequently, it was revealed in a newspaper that the operations of
the church were indeed terminating, and that the members were look-
ing for a new locale.' 3 The very thing that the minority members were
opposed to, and the very thing that the court was sure would not happen,
became a fact hardly one year after the decision. One must wonder just
8 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 398 at 264 n. 61 (2d ed. 1964).
9 Heckman v. Mees, 16 Ohio Rep. 584 (1849). Majority breakaway upheld on the
grounds that implied trust is for the benefit of the majority. Wiswell v. First Con-
gregational Church, 14 Ohio St. 31 (1862). Court would not find implied trust for
creed-less Unitarian church. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio Rep. 364 (1834). Majority
held the property in fee simple, thereby solving the court's dilemma of implied
trusts. Katz v. Goldman, 33 Ohio App. 150 (1929). No implied trust to support ortho-
dox Judaism. Majority was allowed to specify the use of the property.
10 256 N.E. 2d 271 (Comm. Pleas, Ohio 1970).
11 Supra, n. 2, § 1702.39.
12 Supra, n. 10, at 281.
13 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 20, 1971, at 2-B, col. 1.
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what rights a minority member does have, even under a statute and
under court supervision.
In light of past decisions in this area, the Mack 14 court probably
would have come up with the same result had they used an implied trust
theory. Perhaps the failure to use this theory indicates the reluctance
of the courts to use legal fictions, and a tendency to rely more heavily
on statutory requirements. The trend in Ohio seems to be away from
the implied trust, except where lack of good faith can be shown. 15
Texas is another jurisdiction that will not interfere in church property
transfers until all ecclesiastical appeals have been exhausted.16 Ap-
parently they also follow the doctrine of Watson v. Jones,17 and will not
allow an implied trust to defeat the property transfers of a majority.'i
New York's new statutelsa seems to have completely obliterated trust
law as far as non-profit corporations of the type being discussed. This
concept is treated below.
Other jurisdictions, however, favor an implied trust theory. This
is so perhaps because of their reluctance to get involved in ecclesiastical
matters, or perhaps because of the equitable nature of the remedy, or
even because of their desire to refrain from causing resentment among
devoted members.19 In Minnesota, it has been held that property
acquired by a church is impressed with a trust in favor of the church
doctrine. 20 Arkansas, 21 Indiana2 2 and Virginia 2 ' are among other juris-
dictions that still recognize an implied trust to a limited extent.
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in the recent Presbyterian
Church case, 24 it would appear that the state courts now have a prece-
14 Supra, n. 10.
15 Ohio Rev. Code, § 1702.54. See also Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminal Bldg. Co.,
118 F. 2d 89 (C.C.A. Ohio 1941). Fiduciaries charged with handling affairs honestly
and in good faith.
16 Groce, Authority of Officers to Convey for Church, 22 Bay. L. Rev. 222 (1970).
17 Supra, n. 7.
18 Supra, n. 16.
lSa Supra, n. 1, § 513.
'9 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 992,
1026 (1930).
20 Veltman v. DeBoer, 118 N.W. 2d 808 (Minn. 1962). Due notice of meeting and
right of all members to be heard apparently would suffice for majority transfer.
21 Holiman v. Dovers, 366 S.W. 2d 197 (Ark. 1963).
22 Stansberry v. McCarty, 149 N.E. 2d 683 (Ind. 1958). Majority rule final unless
property rights of members, all of whom have interest in property, are violated.
23 Barber v. Caldwell, 152 S.E. 2d 23 (Va. 1967). Majority cannot divert property
to support conflicting doctrines.
24 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). In reversing the Georgia Supreme Court's
finding of an implied trust in favor of the loyal members, the United States Supreme
Court said that in order to decide if the implied trust has been breached, a civil
court must necessarily involve itself in the relative importance of religious doc-
trines-plainly forbidden by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
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dent for denying the implied trust doctrine when looking at majority
transfers. With this theory not available, minority interests may now
have to rest on statutory provisions, trust or deed provisions, or cor-
porate by-law provisions. 25
The doctrine of implied trusts, being a legal fiction,2 5" has been used
in the past to limit majority rule. The trust is usually "implied" to pre-
vent a change in the dogma of the church (or to prevent the flock's
straying from the shepherd, if you will). Today, many of the gifts for
non-profit corporations are given by non-members, corporations, or with
no limitations. In light of these gifts, it becomes difficult for courts to
justify using an implied trust where the donor has made no specific
request that the "creed" of the corporation be continued.
With the absence of a very specific creed or doctrine, how can a
member of a non-religious non-profit corporation 26 claim that an implied
trust should be found to prevent the transfer of corporate assets? While
not using the words "implied trust," the court in Lefkowitz v. Cornell
University2 7 was able to prevent the transfer of property by the ma-
jority interest on a similar theory, i.e., specific purpose. Cornell Uni-
versity, as the recipient of a fully staffed aerodynamics research labora-
tory, wished to sell the lab and put the money to use for general educa-
tion purposes. The court said that the fact that Cornell had treated this
as a specific purpose gift estopped them from selling it for general
purposes. Also, the court said that Cornell must show how the sale of
the property would promote the best interest of carrying out the chari-
table purposes of the trust. Despite the "changing times" (there was
no longer a need for a propeller test lab) and the nature of the gift ("ad-
vancement of science and education" 28), the court was able to come
up with a means of preventing a property transfer. Had Cornell been
a religious corporation, the court could have said that the lab had been
impressed with a trust for the specific purpose of the advancement of
the dogma of Cornell, and that Cornell must prove that its dogma is
being advanced by the sale of the property.
While New York was rejecting the use of "changing times" and up-
holding minority interests in the Cornel 29 case, Connecticut was putting
a great deal of reliance on it in the case of Dagget v. Children's Center.30
That case involved the religious affiliations of the board of directors of
25 Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: the Presbyterian Church
Case, Sup. Ct. Rev. 347 (1969).
25a Elliot, Majority Control of the Property of Independent Churches, 12 Kan. L.
Rev. 436 (1963-64).
28 Supra, n. 1.
27 62 Misc. 2d 95, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
28 Supra, n. 27, 62 Misc. 2d 95 at 96, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 85 at 87 (1970).
29 Supra, n. 27.
30 28 Conn. Sup. 468, 266 A. 2d 72 (1970).
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an orphanage. The original grantor had specified that the board of di-
rectors be comprised solely of Protestants. The court overlooked that
specific provision by stating that "(t) he change in the religious make-
up of the Center's board of managers has not affected the operation of
the center." 31 Further, after looking at the desire not to discriminate and
the fact that the original gift was valued at only one-half percent of the
operating revenue of the foundation, the court was able to conclude that
the purpose of the gift was general enough to allow the majority in-
terest to prevail.
It would seem from these two cases, that if a member can show a
very specific purpose in the operation of the non-profit corporation, he
could probably enforce the proposed disposition to that purpose. How-
ever, because a non-profit corporation is tested by its actual rather than
its stated purposes,3 2 most corporations involve themselves in purposes
broad enough to encompass the problem presented in the Cornel 33 sit-
uation. Therefore, the possibility of a minority member prevailing in an
action to prevent a majority transfer is greatly diminished if the pur-
poses of the corporation are broad in scope.
The Death of Trust Law in New York!
Section 513 of the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Act, in
two short pages, wipes out hundreds of years of trust law for charitable
corporations. The statute makes Type B corporations full owners (not
merely trustees) of all corporate assets. Further, the statute denies that
a Type B corporation can ever be deemed a trustee-even in the event
that the gift names the corporation as trustee (gone forever is the donor's
intent). The statute makes the transfer of assets fully discretionary with
the board of directors and relies nowhere on the approval of the mem-
bers.
This section was purportedly passed to give these types of corpora-
tions flexibility in the administration of their funds within the principles
of corporation law, rather than trust law. 33a However, by giving the
corporation full ownership, the legislature has taken Type B corpora-
tions past the control of corporate law and into the control of common
law property concepts. It seems that a non-profit corporation can buy
and sell property under § 513 (completely at its discretion), and be liable
only for a breach of contract-or perhaps a breach of discretion. The
fiduciary relationship present in corporate law is not present in this New
York law.
31 Supra, n. 30, 28 Conn. Sup. 468, 266 A. 2d 72 at 75 (1970).
32 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations and Associations, 454 (Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 2d ed. 1965).
33 Supra, n.,27.
33a Supra, n. 1, § 513. Legislative Studies and Reports.
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Nowhere3 3b are corporate directors given the power that New York
gives them. Nowhere have the rights of minority interests been so
severely restricted as they have been by § 513. It is difficult to imagine
why the legislature would want to wipe out the remaining police powers
of minority interests, other than to free the courts forever of super-
visory responsibilities. This statute is so broad and clear, that it is diffi-
cult to imagine a situation in which minority interests could ever pre-
vail.
Who May Enforce?
There is little doubt that an outside trustee may enforce a trust to
its specific purpose within the framework of the non-profit corporation; 34
but who is to enforce the rights of the minority members within the
corporation? It has been held that the attorney general, through quo
warranto proceedings, 35 can enforce minority rights where there has
been a misuse of the charitable gift.36 However, this is a common law
power of enforcement, and it is generally considered a very passive
method. 37  Several states (e.g., California,3 8 Illinois,39 New York,40
Ohio4l ) have set up procedures for investigation and enforcement by
the attorney general. Texas,4 2 on the other hand, only provides that the
attorney general's office is the proper party in an enforcement action,
but provides for no method of initial investigation.
43
Some states are silent as to the role of enforcement by the attorney
general,44 or deny him the right of enforcement altogether.45 Professor
33b For a discussion of corporate property sales on a state-by-state basis, see 4
Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, § 1710-§ 1762 (Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 1960, with
1965 supp.).
34 St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. 2d 305 (1939). Use of in-
come for anything other than perpetual fund would be violation of testator's intent.
35 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Norcross, 132 Wis. 534, 112 N.W. 40 (1907). Quo
warranto is a redress of a public wrong, or the enforcement of a public right. Also
see Oleck, supra, n. 32, at 180.
36 Commonwealth v. Seventh Day Baptists, 317 Pa. 358, 176 A. 17 (1935).
ST Bogert and Oaks, Cases on the Law of Trusts, p. 699 (Foundation Press, 1967 ed.).
38 West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Codes, § 12580 et seq.
39 Ill. Rev. Stats., c. 14 § 51 et seq.
40 N.Y. Est., Powers and Trusts L., § 8-1.4.
41 Ohio Rev. Code, § 109.23 et seq.
42 Tex. Civ. Stat., § 4412 (a).
43 Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 Mich.
L. Rev. 633 at 647 (1952). A bill, which would have given the attorney general broad
powers of enforcement, was defeated by the Texas legislature. Apparently strong
pressure was put on by church groups and wealthy trustors to defeat the bill.
44 Alaska Stat., tit. 23, § 10.20.375. This section provides that the attorney general
may bring proceedings to liquidate a non-profit corporation. Otherwise the attorney
general is not mentioned as a proper party in an enforcement action. Also see Colo.
Rev. Stat. ch. 31, art. 20, § 1-14.
(Continued on next page)
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Bogert 46 states that because the attorney general is a political officer with
duties in (and pressures from) the state government, he has little time
for enforcing charitable gifts. Thus, it appears that the attorney general's
office is not the best place to initiate litigation where minority interests
are at stake.4 7
Because a director of a non-profit corporation is a fiduciary, 48 a
member (majority or minority) can bring an action where there has
been a breach of faith in the property transfer. Since some statutes as-
sume the good faith of the director in a property transfer,49 it would
seem that breach of faith becomes a difficult matter for the minority
member to prove. Additionally this would not seem to be a likely
remedy for a minority member since he, more than likely, would be
acting with the majority to prevent further fraud and self-dealing.
It would seem that presently, the best that minority members can
hope for, where there are non-profit statutes, is to attack the statutory
requirements as was done in the Mack-50 case. In the case of Davis v.
Congregation Beth Tephila Israel,5 1 one member of a non-profit corpora-
tion was allowed to maintain an action to prevent a property transfer.
The case involved a consolidation agreement by two religious corpora-
tions with no attempt to comply with the statutory requirements of
merger.5 2 The court said that since this was an ultra vires act, a single
dissenting member of either congregation could maintain an action to
set aside the agreement. The case decisions in this area have added to
the confusion of who may maintain an action. For instance, one Ohio
court 3 said that members, not the trustees of the non-profit corporation,
were vested with the powers to adopt, and presumably enforce, the
fundamental principles of the society. Another Ohio court5 4 has said
(Continued from preceding page)
45 Tenn. Code Anno., tit. 23, § 2809. Although this section says that the attorney
general and the governor (together) may direct that an action be brought, the courts
have interpreted this to mean that the attorney general alone has no authority under
the statute to bring an action to recover misappropriated charitable funds. State ex
rel. Tennessee Children's Home Society v. Hollinsworth, 193 Tenn. 491, 246 S.W. 2d
345 (1952).
46 Supra, n. 43.
47 Souhegan National Bank v. Kenison, 92 N.H. 117, 26 A. 2d 26 (1942). Admission
that the attorney general is forced, by an overload in work, to move sporadically.
48 Oleck, supra, n. 32, at 301.
49 Texas Not for Profit Corp. Act. § 1396-5.08 provides that recordation of deed is
prima facie evidence of proper procedure by director in transfer of property.
50 Supra, n. 10.
51 40 App. Div. 424, 57 N.Y.S. 1015 (1899). See also Agoodash Achim of Ithaca v.
Temple Beth-El. 147 Misc. 405, 263 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
52 N.Y. Rel. Corp. L., § 12.
53 Veterans of W.W.I. v. Levy, 70 Ohio Abs. 49, 118 N.E. 2d 670 (1954).
54 First United Presbyterian Church of New Concord v. Young, 21 Ohio Nisi Prius
(N.S.) 569, 29 Ohio Dec. 477 (1919). Minority members must go through trustees to
enjoin property transfer.
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that trustees, having the powers vested in them, are the proper parties
to bring an action. Professor Howard L. Oleck5 suggests that the best
view is that the trustee actually is vested with power to act for the bene-
fit of all members. With this in mind, it would seem that all a member
would have to do is show that the director (trustee) did not act for the
benefit of all the members of the corporation in transferring the cor-
porate assets. Yet case law and statutes indicate that, whether or not it
should be, this is not always the test used.55
Ohio provides that directors may mortgage any and all property of
a non-profit corporation without the vote of a single member.5 7 Ohio, by
statute, also provides for court supervision of corporate property sales
at any time.5 8 This procedure, however, is not mandatory for all non-
profit corporations according to the court in Fenn College v. Nance.5 9 In
that case, Fenn sought a declaratory judgment on whether it could
cease functioning as an educational institution and transfer its assets to
a newly created state university without court supervision. In answer-
ing the question affirmatively, the court said that since Fenn's Articles
of Incorporation gave it broad plenary powers
"... (i) t is abundantly clear that Fenn has full and complete legal
authority . . . to enter into the (a)greement and . . . (i) t need not
even have resorted to the Court to have such action sanctioned." 59a
It almost seems as if the court did not want to involve itself in a ju-
dicial sale and was willing to let the trustees continue on without any
interference.
New York5 9b provides that leave of court (under Gen. Corp. L.
§ 50 and Relig. Corp. L. § 12) is necessary in order to transfer property
of a religious society.60 However, New York too has case law to the
effect that court approval is not necessary. In the Sun Assets6' case, the
defendant church was alleged to have failed to convey the church prop-
erty pursuant to a contract to sell. The church claimed that since it had
55 Oleck, supra, n. 32, at 301.
56 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 5523a provides that any person who has a right of action
against a trustee in a conveyance of property must do so within ten years. While
one court has ruled that this is a statute of limitations to bar an action by a member:
Dall v. Lindsey, 237 S.W. 2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); another court has said that
since the trustee did not have authority to sell, the ten year period did not affect an
action brought against him: Burrow v. McMahon, 384 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1964).
57 Supra, n. 2, § 170236.
58 Supra, n. 2, § 1702.40 and § 1715.39.
59 33 Ohio Op. 2d 292, 4 Ohio Misc. 183, 210 N.E. 2d 418 (1965).
59a Id., 33 Ohio Op. 2d 292 at 296, 4 Ohio Misc. 183 at 189, 210 N.E. 2d 418 at 422
(1965).
59b Supra, n. 1, § 1112.
60 Wilson v. Ebenezer Baptist Church, Inc., 187 N.Y.S. 2d 861 (1963).
61 Sun Assets Corp. v. English Evangelic Lutheran Church of the Ascension of Bor-
ough Park, 185 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (1963). See also Application of Margolin, 183 N.Y.S. 2d
36 (1963).
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not sought the court's supervision, the contract entered into was void.
The court rejected this argument by stating that the court can always
give approval after the contract is entered into. Since this case involved
two purchasers of the same property, the holding of the case seems to
be contra to the purpose of the statute, 2 which is to give the court
supervisory powers over the sales of property of religious corporations.
The problem presented in Sun AssetsG3 probably never would have
arisen if the court had supervised the sale before the contracts were
entered into.
Texas'4 provides that one-tenth (1/10) of the voting members is a
quorum sufficient to transfer property. Also, the recordation of a deed
of conveyance is prima facie evidence that a resolution of conveyance
was duly adopted by the members.65
Under these statutes and case law the benefit to the corporation
would be very difficult to rebut by a minority interest. How could a
minority complain in Texas when the statute says that the benefit to the
corporation can be shown by a majority vote of little more than five
percent of the members? How can a minority member deny that there
is no benefit to the corporation in Ohio when the courts deny that they
themselves need to supervise property transfers, or when the statute
says that mortgaging property is permissible without voter approval?
How can a minority member in New York complain when the courts
will not supervise the sale of assets until the contractual obligations
have been entered into?
With the state attorneys-general busy in other areas, trustees not
aware of minority interests, members having to overcome statutory pre-
sumptions of good faith transfers, and benefits to the corporation dif-
ficult to rebut under existing statutes and case law, it appears that pro-
tection of minority interest is a chancey possibility at best.
New Paths?
Several writers have suggested corporate remedies in the area of
non-profit corporation litigation.66 While not citing these authorities,
the court in Atwell v. Bide-A-Wee Home Association 7 seems to bear
out these advocates. In that case, the plaintiffs brought a derivative ac-
tion on behalf of the defendant non-profit corporation. Defendant was
62 Supra, n. 52.
63 Supra, n. 61.
64 Tex. Non Profit Corp. Act, art. 1396-2.13. See also Ill. Gen. Not-for-Profit Corp.
Act, § 163 a15.
65 Tex. Non Profit Corp. Act, art. 1396-5.08.
66 Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses, and Abuses 1970, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 207 (1970).
See also Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age,
22 Bus. Law. 951 (1967).
67 59 Misc. 2d 321, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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alleged to have destroyed animals entrusted to its care. The court agreed
with the defendant's contention that plaintiffs were not voting members.
However, the court went on, the mere fact that one of the plaintiffs
had contributed to the corporation gives her standing to bring a deriva-
tive action. The significance of this case is that it was decided before
the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation law was passed (which al-
lows members' derivative actions).60 However forward-looking this
decision may appear on its face, it is tempered by the earlier decision of
In re Dissolution of Cleveland Savings Society 9 which dismissed the
derivative action of the members because they represented personal in-
terests, as opposed to corporate interests. Therefore, derivative actions
will only be supported by the courts (if they are supported at all) where
the minority members can show that corporate interests are at stake.
It would hardly be proper to draw a conclusion from these two cases
that a trend is developing to allow derivative actions in the area of non-
profit property transfers. However, with the provisions of the New
York statute, these cases, and the writers who advocate such a position,
a strong argument can be made for allowing derivative actions-as well
as other corporate remedies.70
Conclusion
There have been varying suggestions for degrees of control, from
intra-corporate board control7 l to infra-structural7 2 ("private initia-
tive") enforcement. This paper, it is hoped, has shown the reluctance
of the courts and legislatures to deal effectively with the problem of
controlling harsh dominance of majority interests over minority in-
terests. With the rapid growth in the numbers of non-profit corpora-
tions, the attorney general's office cannot possibly police them, the leg-
islatures are inherently slow in patchworking outmoded statutes, and
the courts are hopelessly bogged down in legal fictions and conflicting
results.
Admittedly it is difficult to balance control and enforcement with
initiative and philanthropy and still come up with a viable policing mech-
anism that will not stifle non-profit growth. To this end, the only hope
seems to be to either adopt a uniform non-profit statute with enforce-
6s Supra, n. 1, § 623.
69 90 Ohio Law Abs. 3, 183 N.E. 2d 234 (1962).
70 Oleck, supra, n. 26. Professor Oleck lists corporation law principles that apply in
non-profit corporations. § 218 at 450.
71 Taft, Control of Foundations and Other Non-Profit Corporations, 18 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 478 (1969).
72 Alford, supra, n. 5.
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ment sections that will work,7 3 or set up a separate policing agency
not unlike what the SEC does for profit oriented corporations. 4
As stated at the outset, my purpose is to show the development (or
should I say lack of development) of minority rights in non-profit prop-
erty transfers. I leave to others the task of devising the system to ef-
fectively police non-profit corporations and thus properly protect mi-
nority interests.
M E.g., Oleck, supra, n. 26, at 577. Professor Oleck advocates, in his proposed tTni-
form Act for Non-Profit Organizations, a licensing commission, state supreme court
supervision, and intervention by "any interested person."
74 Oleck, supra, n. 51, at 236.
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